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JUDICIAL SCRUTINY OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCRETION IN THE DECISION NOT
TO FILE A COMPLAINT
SAMUEL BECKER
I.

INTRODUCTION

While prosecutorial discretion to institute criminal proceedings is subject to judicial review under certain circumstances, it has been recognized
that there is no effective procedure for reviewing the decision not to prosecute. 1 Commentators and professional organizations have recognized that
due to a lack of review, a risk arises that impermissible considerations may
result in decisions not to prosecute, so they have suggested that some form
of judicial review should be provided.2
The Wisconsin legislature shared this concern and attempted to provide
such a system of review by enacting section 968.02 of the Wisconsin Statutes3 and by repealing section 955.17 of the statutes4 in a revision of the
state criminal code.5
The session law which created section 968.02 included a Prefatory Note
along with its explicit provisions, committee comments and notes. 6 The
pertinent portions state:
1. Miller & Remington, ProceduresBefore Trial, 339 ANNALS, ACADEMY OF POLITICAL
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES 111 (1962).
2. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE (Tent. Draft No. 1 1966); The Prosecuting Function, Commentary to Standard 3-2.1 (2d ed. 1980); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of
ProsecutionalPower, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1546 (1981); Comment, Private Prosecution:A
Remedy for DistrictAttorneys' UnwarrantedInaction, 65 YALE L.J. 209, 234 (1955); Note, Private
Challenges to ProsecutorialInaction:A Model DeclaratoryStatute 97 YALE L.J. 488 (1987); see
also State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 144 n.2 and 147 n.5, 401
N.W.2d 782, 789 n.5 and 794 n.5 (1987) (Abrahamsom, J., concurring).
3. Wis. STAT. § 968.02 (1985-86).
4. Wis. STAT. § 955.17 (1967) (repealed 1969).

5. Act of Nov. 25, 1969, Ch. 255, 1969 WIs. LAws 602 (codified at Wis. Stat. § 968.02 (198586)).
6. Id. The Prefatory Note in its entirety reads:
PREFATORY NOTE: In 1967 the Judicial Council established a Criminal Rules Committee to prepare a complete redraft of those statutes which deal with procedure in criminal cases. Funds for this project were made available by the legislature.
The Criminal Rules Committee had as its co-chairman [sic], Circuit Judges Herbert J.
Steffies, Milwaukee, and Richard W. Orton, Lancaster. The other members of the Committee were County Judge Mark J. Farnum, Beloit, Assistant Attorney General William
Platz, Madison, Professor Frank J. Remington of the University of Wisconsin Law School,
Professor Michael Hogan of Marquette University Law School, Deputy District Attorney
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968.02 ISSUANCE AND FILING OF COMPLAINTS. (1)
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a complaint charging a
person with an offense shall be issued only by a district attorney of
the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed. A
complaint is issued when it is approved for filing by the district at-

Ben Wiener, Milwaukee, Attorneys Daniel Flaherty, LaCrosse, David Leichtfuss, Milwaukee, John H. Bowers, Madison and Attorney James E. Hough, Secretary to the Council.
County Judges William Curran, Mauston and Warren Grady, Port Washington, served on
the Committee for a portion of its work. The Reporter for the revision was Attorney
Francis R. Croak, Milwaukee.
This bill represents a complete redraft of the statutes dealing with 6riminal procedure
in the State of Wisconsin. It repeals Chapters 954 to 964 and creates Chapters 967 to 976.
The bill attempts to codify statutory and case law in systematic form beginning with the
initiation of the criminal process (the issuance of complaints and warrants) and ending
with post conviction remedies. Procedural revisions of other states and the federal system
have been studied as well as various model acts of such groups as the American Law
Institute. Also considered wherever applicable were the recently published reports of the
American Bar Association project of minimum standards for criminal justice.
968.01 COMPLAINT. The complaint is a written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged. It may be made on information and belief. It shall be made
upon oath before a district attorney or judge as provided in this chapter.
NOTE: Restatement of present § 954.02(1) with the additional authorization for a
complaint to be sworn to before a district attorney.
968.02 ISSUANCE AND FILING OF COMPLAINTS. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a complaint charging a person with an offense shall be issued only by
a district attorney of the county where the crime is alleged to have been committed. A
complaint is issued when it is approved for filing by the district attorney. The approval
shall be in the form of a written indorsement on the complaint.
(2) After a complaint has been issued, it shall be filed with a judge and either a warrant
or summons shall be issued or the complaint shall be dismissed, pursuant to s. 968.03.
Such filing commences the action.
(3) If a district attorney refuses or is unavailable to issue a complaint, a circuit judge
may permit the filing of a complaint, if the judge finds there is probable cause to believe
that the person to be charged has committed an offense after conducting a hearing. Where
the district attorney has refused to issue a complaint, he shall be informed of the hearing
and may attend. The hearing shall be ex parte without the right of cross-examination.
Comments: This is a change from the present law designed to give the district attorney
a greater voice in the initiating of criminal proceedings. Since his is the obligation of
conducting the prosecution it is believed that he should have a voice in the screening
out of unfounded complaints and in determining if there was sufficient evidence to
warrant prosecution.
Sub. (3) provides a check upon the district attorney who fails to authorize the issuance of a complaint, when one should have been issued, by providing for a judge to
authorize its issuance.
Sub. (3) also provides a vehicle for the issuance of complaints when the district
attorney is unavailable.
The section is based upon s. 601 of the A.L.I. Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 968.01-.02 (1969) (emphasis added).
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torney. The approval shall be in the form of a written indorsement
on the complaint.
(2) After a complaint has been issued, it shall be filed with a
judge and either a warrant or summons shall be issued or the complaint shall be dismissed, pursuant to s. 968.03. Such filing commences the action.
(3) If a district attorney refuses or is unavailable to issue a complaint, a circuit judge may permit the filing of a complaint, if the
judge finds there is probable cause to believe that the person to be
charged has committed an offense after conducting a hearing. If the
district attorney has refused to issue a complaint, he or she shall be
informed of the hearing and may attend. The hearing shall be ex
parte without the right of cross-examination. 7
As a result of these provisions, only the district attorney could issue a criminal complaint, rather than permitting the district attorney or judge to issue
a complaint. If the district attorney was unwilling or unable to issue a complaint, a judge could do so upon a finding of probable cause.
The repeal of section 955.17 of the Wisconsin Statutes abolished a practice that had been in effect for almost 100 years. The practice originated
with the enactment of section 6, chapter 137, Laws of 1871,8 following the
amendment of article I, section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution 9 which had
eliminated the requirement of a grand jury indictment.10 The provision was
renumbered and re-enacted on several occasions, without change of substance, until its repeal in 1969.11
The repealed statute provided that if the district attorney, after examining all the facts and circumstances connected with the preliminary hearing,
determined that an information should not be filed, then the district attorney had to file a statement of his reasons, both in fact and in law, for his
decision. If the court was not satisfied with the statement of the district
attorney, and it so stated in writing, the district attorney was required to file
an information anyway.
The Criminal Rules Committee of the Judicial Council was not exaggerating when, in advocating the enactment of section 968.02 and the repeal of
section 955.17, it stated "[t]his is a change from the present law designed to
give the district attorney a greater voice in the initiation of criminal pro7. Wis. STAT. § 968.02(3) (1969) (emphasis added).
8. Act approved Mar. 23, 1871, ch. 137, § 36, 1871 Wis. Laws 201, 210.
9. WIs. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
10. See State v. Leicham, 41 Wis. 565, 574 (1877).
11. Wis. STAT. ch. 190 (1875); Wis. STAT. § 4653 (1878); WIs. STAT. § 355.17 (1925); Wis.
STAT. § 955.17 (1955) (repealed 1969).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:749

ceedings."' 2 The new law gave the district attorney the sole authority to file
complaints and repealed the authority of the court to reject the district attorney's decision not to file an information. In exchange, section 968.02
retained for the court the discretion to file a complaint on the petition of a
complainant if the district attorney was unwilling or unable to do so.
II.

PROLOGUE

For almost twenty-five years, the enactment of section 968.02(3) and the
accompanying repeal of section 955.17 created no professional or public
stir. The attorney general even advised the district attorneys to seek a special prosecutor if the judge authorized the filing of the complaint.13 Then in
October, 1984, a highly publicized incident occurred.
Two professional football players allegedly assaulted a female dancer in
a Milwaukee nightclub dressing room. She filed a complaint with the Milwaukee County District Attorney who, after conducting an investigation,
decided not to issue a criminal complaint. The District Attorney issued a
statement setting forth nineteen reasons for his decision in which he asserted that his decision was not based on the lack of probable cause.
Rather, he did not issue a complaint because he did not believe he could
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
Following the district attorney's refusal to issue a complaint, the dancer
filed a petition under section 968.02(3) in the Circuit Court of Milwaukee
County requesting the assignment of a14judge to issue a complaint. A judge
was assigned to evaluate the petition.
When the judge closed the proceedings to the public, various newspapers and radio and television stations petitioned the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals to open the hearings.15 After the court of appeals denied their
request, the media appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court for relief.16
The supreme court granted the media the sought relief. However, in the
course of its decision, the supreme court alerted the parties charged in the
12. 1969 Wis. Laws ch. 255 (Criminal Rules Committee Note for Proposed § 968.02 Stats.).
13. B. BROWN, THE WISCONSIN DISTRICT ATORNEY AND THE CRIMINAL CASE, 55 (rev.
2d ed. 1977).
14. In re K.M.: WISN-TV v. Unnamed Petitioners, No. 85-0172 (Wis. Ct. App. March 1,
1985).
15. State ex reL. Newspapers, Inc. v. Connors, No. 85-0155-W (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 1, 1985)
(order denying issuance of supervisory writ); State ex rel. WISN-TV v. Connors, No. 85-0149-W
(Wis. Ct. App. March 1, 1985) (order denying issuance of supervisory writ).
16. State ex rel. Newspapers, Inc. v. Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, 124 Wis. 2d 499,
370 N.W.2d 209 (1985), reconsideration denied, 126 Wis. 2d 41, 374 N.W.2d 142 (1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1061 (1986).
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complaint that the constitutionality of the proceedings could be questioned
17
under the separation of powers doctrine.
Upon remand of the case to the Milwaukee County Circuit Court, the
supreme court ordered a hearing on the petition to permit the circuit court
to file a complaint after the refusal of the district attorney to do so. The
parties to be charged then appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court to
prohibit the judge from holding the hearing on the separation of powers
basis previously suggested by the supreme court itself in the prior proceeding. The resulting relief that the court granted is the subject of this article.

III.

THE CONNORS DECISION

In State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors,8 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court deemed section 986.02(3) unconstitutional as a violation of
the doctrine of separation of powers. In doing so, the court asserted that
"[u]nder sec. 968.02(3), Stats., executive power is voided and, at the siren
call of the legislature, judicial power supersedes the executive
discretion."' 9
The court construed the challenged provision to authorize the judiciary
to make a de novo determination whether to prosecute. It reasoned that the
district attorney performed an executive branch function in prosecuting
criminal violations and that giving a judge the power to issue a criminal
complaint materially impaired the executive function of prosecution, thus
violating the separation of powers doctrine, even though the district attorney had refused to prosecute.2 °
However, the supreme court's determination of the issue was erroneous,
and its analysis was flawed. It incorrectly assumed that the prosecutorial
function constitutionally included the power to initiate a criminal proceeding by filing a complaint. In fact, the state constitution lodged this power in
the circuit court, subject to the power of the legislature to prohibit or alter
it. The court failed to consider the role and function of the legislature and
judiciary in matters of criminal procedure. It failed to distinguish the

17. Newspapers, 124 Wis. 2d at 505 n.3, 370 N.W.2d at 213 n.3.
18. 136 Wis. 2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987).

19. Id. at 141 n.9, 401 N.W.2d at 792 n.9. Section 968.02(3) was enacted by the legislature,
not on its own initiative, but at the request of the Judicial Council acting through its Criminal
Rules Committee. The Judicial Council acts in an advisory capacity to the supreme court to assist
it in performing its duties to regulate practice and procedure in judicial proceedings. See Wis.
STAT. § 751.12 (1985-86). The supreme court has not hesitated to be guided by the council's
advice; cf In the Matter of the Rules Of Criminal Procedure: Sec. 971.20, Stats., 110 Wis. 2d 242,
328 N.W.2d 284 (1983).

20. Blinka & Hammer, Supreme Court Digest, 60 Wis. B. BULL. 41, 47 (May 1987).
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power to accuse from the power to prosecute, and in doing so overturned a
practice "sanctioned by long usage and general recognition."2 1
IV.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN WISCONSIN

LAW

The authority to initiate a criminal proceeding historically has been a
judicial function. It had never been within the authority of the district attorney until the legislature empowered district attorneys to share such authority with the courts in 1945. For more than 100 years of Wisconsin's
existence as a political entity - from 1836 to 1848 as a territory and from
1848 to 1945 as a state - the commencement of criminal proceedings was
the exclusive domain of the judiciary.
Criminal proceedings in this state traditionally have been initiated either
by issuance of a criminal complaint or by grand jury indictment. Our
supreme court has recognized both methods as the exercise of a judicial
function. The grand jury indictment was so described because the entire
proceeding is under the control of the court. 2 2 The supreme court has similarly described the issuance of a criminal complaint by a judicial
officer
23
court.
the
of
control
the
under
proceeding
the
which brings
The commencement of a criminal proceeding by a magistrate's issuance
of a complaint originated in Wisconsin in a statute entitled "An Act to
Provide for the Arrest and Examination of Offenders, Commitment for
Trial and Taking Bail."'2 4 These provisions were in force at the time of the
21. State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d 808, 827, 266 N.W.2d 597, 606 (1978).
22. State ex reL Caledonia v. Racine County Court, 78 Wis. 2d 429, 431-34, 254 N.W.2d 317,
319 (1977); Report of Grand Jury: Williams, 204 Wis. 409, 412, 235 N.W. 789, 790 (1931).

23. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 821-22, 266 N.W.2d at 605 (distinguishing commencement of
John Doe proceeding from that of standard criminal action); State ex reL Long v. Keyes, 75 Wis.
288, 44 N.W. 13 (1889).

A judicial officer would include a magistrate, a judge of a court of

record, a court commissioner or a justice of the peace.
24. 1839 STAT. OF THE TERRITORY OF WIS. 369, §§ 1-2 (1839). Section one provides as follows: "That for the apprehension of persons charged with offences, the justices of the supreme
court, of the district courts in vacation as well as in term time, and all justices of the peace, are
authorized to issue process to carry into effect the provisions of this statute."

Section two provides as follows:
Upon complaint made to any such magistrate that a criminal offence has been committed,

he shall examine on oath the complainant and any witnesses produced by him, and shall
reduce the complaint to writing, and shall cause the same to be subscribed by the complainant; and if it shall appear that any such offence has been committed, the court or

justice shall issue a warrant reciting the substance of the accusation, and requirng the
officer to whom it shall be directed forthwith to take the person accused and bring him
before the said court or justices, or before some other court or magistrate of the county, to
be dealt with according to law; and in the same warrant may require the officer to summon
such witnesses as shall be therein named, to appear and give evidence on the examination.
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adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution in March of 1848. The first state
legislature re-enacted these provisions verbatim at its second session on
June 10, 1849.25
Although the district attorney is mentioned only once in chapters 145
and 146 of the Criminal Code of 1849, and though it may be unclear when
the district attorney is required to become involved in the criminal process,
section 64 of chapter 10 of the Revised Statutes of 1849 offers some insight.
That section provides that if the magistrate so requests, the district attorney
must appear for the state and conduct the examination of witnesses at any
examination conducted by the magistrate.2 6 Such examination included the
original ex parte complaint hearing, any bail hearing requested by the accused, and the preliminary hearing at which the accused would be bound
over for trial if the magistrate found probable cause to believe the accused

guilty.
The district attorney was not entitled to attend such hearings unless the
magistrate requested his presence for purposes of advice and assistance. In
no case did the district attorney have any part in deciding whether a complaint should be issued.
The reasons for entrusting this authority to issue a complaint to a magistrate rather than to a prosecutor are probably the same as the policy considerations behind the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in State ex
rel. White v. Simpson." In Simpson, the court held unconstitutional the
provision of chapter 558, Laws of 1945, which authorized a district attorney to issue a warrant of arrest. The court based its decision on the ground
that the district attorney is not the equivalent of a neutral and detached
magistrate who may be constitutionally empowered to authorize the issuance of an arrest warrant.
Since the complaint hearing by the magistrate was an ex parte proceeding in which the accused was neither present nor represented, and because
there was no cross-examination of the witnesses,2 8 placement of this responsibility in the hands of an impartial judicial officer was believed to be more
solicitous and protective of the rights of the innocent. The involvement of
the district attorney would arise only when the accused was bound over for
trial.

25. See Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 145, §§ 1-2 (1849).
26. See State ex rel Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors 136 Wis. 2d 118, 165-71, 401 N.W.2d
782, 802-03 (1987) (Steinmetz, J., dissenting).
27. 28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965).
28. See State v. McCredden, 33 Wis. 2d 661, 667, 148 N.W.2d 33, 38 (1967).
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The provisions of sections 1 and 2 of chapter 145, Revised Statutes of
1849, have been recodified periodically and have remained substantially
in unchanged form.29 In 1945, for the first time under chapter 558, Laws of
1945 which created Wisconsin Statute section 361.02(1), 3° a complaint
could be issued by the district attorney, as well as by a magistrate. If a
magistrate issued a complaint, he was under a duty to issue a warrant, or
later, a summons. If the district attorney issued a similar complaint, he was
empowered, but not required, to issue such process. The authority of the
district attorney to issue a warrant was repealed after the decision in
31
Simpson.
Although the authority to issue a criminal complaint came to be shared
by the magistrate and the district attorney in 1945, apparently it was common practice only for the magistrate to issue complaints until 1949. In
State ex rel. Pflanz v. County Court of Dane County,3 2 the court stated that
"[p]rior to 1949.. .the practice was for the magistrate to examine the complainant and his witnesses on oath and to reduce the charge to writing in
the complaint if he thought there was probable cause."'3 3 This practice of
taking oral testimony to satisfy the magistrate that probable cause existed
was held to meet constitutional standards.34
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY
The origin and early history of magistrates issuing criminal complaints
was recounted in State ex rel. Long v. Keyes.3 5 In that case, a witness who
had been subpoenaed by the magistrate sought a writ of prohibition against
the magistrate challenging his authority to issue the subpoena. The state
contended that the power of the magistrate in such a proceeding was not
judicial, but administrative or ministerial in nature, and therefore was not
subject to a writ of prohibition.
The supreme court held that a magistrate proceeding under section
4776, Revised Statutes of 1889, which provided for the issuance of a criminal complaint by a magistrate, was exercising judicial powers not inquisitorial functions. Therefore, the court held that this was a proper case for
29. Wis. STAT. §§ 361.01-02 (1925); Wis. STAT. §§ 4775-76 (1898); Wis. STAT. §§ 4775-76

(1878).

30. Wis. STAT. § 361.02(1)
31.

(1945).
28 Wis. 2d 590, 137 N.W.2d 391 (1965).

32. 36 Wis. 2d 550, 153 N.W.2d 559 (1967).
33. Id. at 554, 153 N.W.2d at 561.
34. Id. (citing State v. Davie, 62 Wis. 305, 22 N.W. 411 (1885) and Murphy v. State, 124 Wis.
635, 102 N.W. 1087 (1905)).
35. 75 Wis. 288, 44 N.W. 13 (1889).
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invoking the writ. However, the court denied the writ holding that the
magistrate was acting within his powers.3 6 In State ex rel. De Puy v. Evans,3 7 the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited the Keyes decision with approval
in describing such proceedings as an exercise of judicial powers.3"
Since the power to issue criminal complaints was within the jurisdiction
of circuit courts at the time of the adoption of the Wisconsin Constitution
and was not excluded by it, the legislature was constitutionally empowered
to confer such power upon the courts by virtue of section 8, article VII of
the constitution. This precise issue arose in Faust v. State.3 9
In Faust,the State proceeded against the defendant under sections 1 to
3, chapter 176, of the Revised Statutes 1858. 4 The defendant contended
that the legislature had no authority to confer on magistrates the power to
issue a criminal complaint or a warrant of arrest to conduct a preliminary
investigation as provided by chapter 176. The court rejected this contention, stating:
Again it is said by the counsel for the defendant, that under the
constitution the legislature had no authority to confer upon judges
of courts of record, or court commissioners, the power to issue process for the arrest and examination of persons charged with crimes;
and that therefore sec. 1 of ch. 176, R. S. 1858, so far as it confers
that power upon court commissioners and judges in vacation, is
void. This power was conferred upon the judges in vacation by the
revised statutes of 1849, and upon the court commissioners in 1858;
and we have no knowledge that the right to do so was ever questioned until the trial of this action. This long acquiescence of courts
and the bar in the validity of the law is strong reason for believing
that it is not invalid. There is, however, another fact which is conclusive of the right to confer that power both upon the judges and
the court commissioners. It will be found that the general statutes of
Wisconsin passed in 1839, long before the adoption of our state constitution, conferred this power upon the judges of the courts of record in the territory, to be exercised both in term time and in
vacation. This power of arrest and examination of offenders by process issued by the judges of the courts of record in vacation, was a
known power, conferred upon and exercised by the judges of the
courts of record at the time of the adoption of the constitution of
36.
37.
38.
at 603.
39.
40.

Id. at 299, 44 N.W. at 17.
88 Wis. 255, 60 N.W. 433 (1894).
Id. at 263, 60 N.W. at 435; see also State v. Washington, 83 Wis. 2d at 820, 266 N.W.2d
45 Wis. 273 (1878).
These sections were identical to sections 1 to 3 of chapter 145, Revised Statutes 1849.
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this state; and as the constitution of the state does not expressly take
from the legislature the right to continue this power, it may, undoubtedly, confer it; and if it can be conferred upon the judges, then,
under see. 23, art. VII of the constitution, it can be conferred upon
court commissioners. 4 1
Section 8 of article VII provided as follows: "[t]he circuit courts shall
have original jurisdiction in all matters, civil and criminal, within this state,
not excepted in this constitution, and not hereafter prohibited by law
.... ,42 This provision was amended in 1977 to read "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law, the circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal within this state ...
No change was intended or
effected by this amendment. In any case, the original provision was in force
when the challenged provision was enacted in 1969. The language quoted
from Faust was quoted with approval in State ex reL Perry v. Wolke."'
Although the precise issue in Faust was the power of a court commissioner to conduct a preliminary hearing, the language and reasoning of the
decision sustained the constitutional authority of the legislature to confer
the power to issue criminal complaints upon the circuit court. This is justified because the power existed at the time of the adoption of the constitution and was not forbidden by it, and because of the long acquiescence of
the bench and bar of its validity.
Since the constitution expressly authorized the legislature to continue
this power in the circuit court, in whole or in part, the legislature could
deny the power, restrict it or retain it for the court in the limited circumstances specified in section 968.02(3). 4"
The conclusive effect of Faust on this issue is buttressed by a series of
decisions of the Wisconsin Supreme Court interpreting and applying section
4, article VI of the Wisconsin Constitution. Section 4(1) creates a number
of county offices, including the sheriff, coroner and the district attorney
among others, but it does not delineate their powers or duties. The court
filled this void by holding that the framers of the constitution intended that
the named offices should have such powers as were distinctive and characteristic of each office when the constitution was adopted as determined by
'

41. Faust,45 Wis. at 275-76.

42. WIs. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1849, amended 1977).
43. Id.
44. 71 Wis. 2d 100, 107-08, 237 N.W.2d 678, 687 (1976).
45. E.B. v. State, 111 Wis. 2d 175, 181-84, 330 N.W.2d 584, 588-89 (1983); State v. Krause,
260 Wis. 313, 319, 50 N.W.2d 439, 442 (1951); In re Constitutionality of Section 251.18, Wis.
STAT., 204 Wis. 501, 513, 236 N.W. 717, 722 (1931).
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reference to the common law and the territorial statutes in effect at that
time.
46
This doctrine was first pronounced in State ex rel. Kennedy v. Brunst.
In Brunst, the court held unconstitutional a statute replacing the sheriff of
Milwaukee County as jailor of the county jail with the inspector of the
House of Corrections on the ground that it deprived the sheriff of his constitutional power. The court stated:
Now, it is quite true that the constitution nowhere defines what powers, rights and duties shall attach or belong to the office of sheriff.
But there can be no doubt that the framers of the constitution had
reference to the office with those generally recognized legal duties
and functions belonging to it in this country, and in the territory,
when the constitution was adopted. Among those duties, one of the
most characteristic and well acknowledged was the custody of the
common jail and the prisoners therein. This is apparent from the
statutes and authorities cited by counsel for the respondent.4'
Brunst was followed in State ex rel. Milwaukee County v. Buech,48
which sustained the validity of a statute making a civil service law applicable to the appointment of deputies in the office of the sheriff. Referring to
Brunst, the Buech court opined:
With no disposition to question the doctrine of that case, we do not
think it should be extended to the extent here urged. We think it
should be confined to those immemorial principal and important duties that characterized and distinguished the office. While, at common law, the sheriff possessed the power to appoint deputies, it was
not a power or authority that gave character and distinction to the
office. Many other officers as well as sheriffs possessed the power. It
was more in the nature of a general power possessed by all officers to
a more or less extent and was not peculiar to the office of sheriff.4 9
Brunst was followed again in Wisconsin ProfessionalPoliceAssociation v.
Dane County"° where the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the legislature could not constitutionally authorize a collective bargaining agreement
which deprived the sheriff of his constitutional authority to select who
among his deputies should act as court officers.5 The court further held
that attendance on a court was in the same category of powers inherent in
the office of sheriff as running a jail, but it remanded the case to the trial
46.
47.
48.
49.

26 Wis. 412 (1870).
Id. at 414.
171 Wis. 474, 177 N.W. 781 (1920).
Id. at 482, 177 N.W. at 784.

50. 106 Wis. 2d 303, 316 N.W.2d 656 (1982) (on by-pass from court of appeals).
51. Id. at 317, 316 N.W.2d at 662-63.
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court to determine the precise duties of the deputies assigned as court officers.5 2 Justice Abrahamson, in her dissent, noted that while the powers
and duties distinctive to and characterizing the office of the sheriff are constitutionally immune from legislative interference, such immunity was 53also
applicable to deputies assigned to perform the duties of court officers.
In Schultz v. Milwaukee County, 4 the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the doctrine of Brunst to a statute transferring the function of holding
inquests from the coroner to the office of medical examiner. The court analyzed the history of the office of the coroner and the territorial statutes in
force at the time the constitution was adopted, and decided that the holding
of an inquest was not such a distinctive and characteristic feature of the
office of the coroner at that time to constitute a constitutional power immune from legislative invasion. However, Justice Fairchild's5 6 dissenting
opinion disputed the majority reading of the statutory history.
In applying the doctrine of Brunst to the office of the coroner, the court
noted that the constitution provided for the offices of sheriff and of coroner
in the same section.5 7 It may be further noted that the office of district
attorney is also provided for in that section and that all three offices are
involved in the criminal justice system. 8
Thus, the rule in Brunst is applicable to the office of the district attorney. Its application requires the conclusion that the district attorney has no
constitutional power to initiate a criminal proceeding by issuing a complaint or otherwise because the office had no such power at common law or
under the territorial statutes in effect at the time of the adoption of the
Wisconsin Constitution.
When the constitution was adopted, the authority to initiate a criminal
proceeding, by complaint or otherwise, was the exclusive domain of the
judiciary.59 The powers and duties of the district attorney were defined in a
statute enacted by the first territorial legislature which was in force when
the constitution was adopted. 6° That statute provided that the district attorney shall prosecute or defend in all courts of the district to which he is
appointed all matters civil and criminal, in which the United States, the
52. Id. at 319, 316 N.W.2d at 663.

316 N.W.2d at 664 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting).
13 N.W.2d 580 (1944).
13 N.W.2d at 584.
N.W.2d at 585 (Fairchild, J., dissenting).
N.W.2d at 581 (citing Wis. CONsT. art. VI, § 4).
58. WIS. CONsT. art VI, § 4.
59. See supra text accompanying notes 22-40.
60. An Act Concerningthe Attorney - Generaland District-Attorneys,STATS.
TORY OF Wis. at 94 (1839).
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 319-20,
245 Wis. 111,
Id. at 121-22,
Id. at 123, 13
Id. at 113, 13
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territory, the county or township is a party or is interested, and advise the
civil officers of the district on any matter of public interest.6 1
The substance of this statute was re-enacted by the first state legislature
at its second session on June 10, 1849, as sections 63 and 64 of chapter 10 of
the Revised Statutes of 1849. The legislature added a provision that required the district attorney to conduct criminal examinations at the request
of any magistrate.62
It is undisputed that the district attorney, or the public prosecutor, however named, had no power or authority to initiate a criminal prosecution at
common law. 63 In Wisconsin, the common law is defined to include English decisions and statutes in force at the time of the American revolution,
as well as customs, usages, legal maxims and principles in vogue in our
colonial era or at the time of adoption of the state constitution.r6
In light of the principles announced in Faust and Brunst, there is no
basis for lodging any such constitutional power in the district attorney
based on a concession by the attorney general "that the district attorney is
an officer of the executive branch of state government, which branch, under
the aegis of the governor, has the duty under the constitution to 'take care
that the laws be faithfully executed.' "65
The attorney general is a constitutional officer under the Wisconsin
Constitution 66 and has been conceded to be an officer of the executive
branch.6' Nevertheless, our state supreme court has consistently held that
the powers of that office are only those conferred by the legislature because
the constitution so sets forth.6 8
Precisely the same must be said of the district attorney. Article VI,
section 4(1) of the Wisconsin Constitution, as interpreted in Brunst and its
progeny, does not confer on the district attorney any powers the office did
not exercise at common law or under the territorial statutes in force at the
61. Id. at § 3.
62. Wis. REv. STAT. ch. 10, § 64 (1849).
63. Goldstein, History of Public Prosecution, 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIM. JUST. 1286 (S. Kadish ed. 1983); Steinberg, From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: CriminalProsecution, the
DistrictAttorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME AND DELINQ. 568 (1984); Comment,
The District Attorney - A HistoricalPuzzle, 1952 WIs. L. REV. 125, 125 n.1, 126, 137, 138.

64. Menne v. Fond du Lac, 273 Wis. 341, 345, 77 N.W.2d 703, 705 (1956).
65. State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors 136 Wis. 2d 118, 123-24, 401 N.W.2d 782,
784 (1987) (citing Wis. CONST. art. V,§ 4).
66. WIS. CONST. art. VI, §§ 1, 3.
67. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 131, 401 N.W.2d at 787-88.
68. Id. WIS. CONST. art. VI, § 3 states that the powers of the attorney general should be those
provided by law; see also Christenson, The State Attorney General, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 298, 301
and n. 21.
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time of the adoption of the constitution. Nor were any such powers conferred under statutes enacted by the state legislature shortly after the adoption of the constitution.
Moreover, the constitutional duty of the governor to attend to the faithful execution of the laws has never been held to confer on the governor or
the executive branch any specific powers not otherwise existing under the
constitution. In a seminal opinion, Walter C. Owen, then the attorney general and later a supreme court justice, pointed out that the "take care"
clause refers to general and supervisory powers, rather than conferring specific powers not otherwise granted in the constitution.69 This view is held
by a majority of the authorities that have considered the matter.7" In any
case, the general language of the "take care" clause must yield to the specific language of article VII, section 8 and article VI, section 4(1) to deny
the district attorney or the executive branch the constitutional power to
initiate criminal proceedings.7 1
An equally persuasive ground for denying the effect which the Connors
majority ascribes to the "take care" clause is found in the decision of State
v. Beno.7 2 The Beno court reiterated the analysis which should be employed
in interpreting provisions of the Wisconsin Constitution. The court expressed that it will examine: the plain meaning of words; the constitutional
debates and practices in existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution; and the earliest interpretation of the provision by the legislature as
manifested in the first law passed following the adoption of the
constitution.7 3
The plain language of the "take care" clause is not self-defining and the
constitutional debates on this issue are non-existent. On the other hand, the
practice in existence at the time of the adoption of the constitution which
was set forth in the territorial statute enacted by the first territorial legislature, was adopted verbatim by the first state legislature.74 Under the principles of interpretation pronounced in Beno, the interpretation of the first
legislature must be controlling.
None of the cases relied upon by the Connors majority in support of the
"near-limitless discretion of the prosecutor to charge or not" involve a decision to issue a complaint.7" Each decision involves the discretionary au69. 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 804, 806 (1914).
70. See generally 81 C.J.S. States § 130 at 565-66 (1977 & Supp. 1987).

71. State ex rel. Bond. v. French, 2 Pin. 181, 1 Chand. 30 (1849).
72.

116 Wis. 2d 122, 341 N.W.2d 668 (1984).

73. Id. at 675. For the relevant legislation, see supra note 25 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
75. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 130, 401 N.W.2d at 787.
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thority of the district attorney to convene an inquest; to file an information;
to decide which persons, crimes or offenses to charge; or generally, to discharge the duty of the district attorney under Wisconsin Statute section
59.47(2) in the prosecution of all criminal actions in his county and the
conduct of all criminal examinations when requested by the court.
State v. Karpinski76 involved the issuance of a complaint by the district
attorney, but arose after the statute gave the district attorney sole authority
to issue complaints in 1969. The rhetoric inthese cases concerning the unfettered discretion of the district attorney to prosecute does not deal with
the issue in Connors, which is whether the legislature has constitutional authority to determine when the court, rather than the district attorney, may
initiate a criminal proceeding by filing a complaint.
The assertion of the majority in Connors that "[t]he only limit that Wisconsin has recognized on a district attorney's initial charging discretion is
charging that demonstrably violates general standards of equal protection"
is belied by the 100 year history of section 955.17 and its predecessors.7 7 As
noted previously, these statutes empowered the circuit court or judge to
reject the district attorney's refusal to file an information if not satisfied
with his reasons for failing to do so, and require the district attorney to file
an information. The bench and the bar had long acquiesced in this statute. 78 In 1969, the Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that "[i]t appears settled, therefore, in Wisconsin at least, that the prosecutor is subject to the
enactments of the legislature."'79 For example, section 955.17 of the Wisconsin Statutes requires a district attorney to state in writing his reasons for
not filing an information against a person who has been bound over for
trial. If those reasons satisfy the judge, the district attorney endorses "approved" upon the statement, but if the judge finds the reasons insufficient,
the district attorney is obliged to file the information and bring the case to
80
trial.
The doctrine of separation of powers forbids any intrusion by one
branch of government upon a constitutional power expressly conferred
upon another branch. In the case of shared powers, it forbids one branch
from unduly burdening or substantially interfering with another branch's
exercise of constitutional power.8 1 The doctrine of separation of powers
does not forbid the legislative abolition, transfer or limitation of a statutory
76. 92 Wis. 2d 599, 285 N.W.2d 729 (1979).
77. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 130, 401 N.W.2d at 787.

78.
79.
80.
81.

State v. Fish, 20 Wis. 2d 431, 437-38, 122 N.W.2d 381, 385 (1963).
State ex reL Kurkierewicz v. Cannon, 42 Wis. 2d 368, 380, 166 N.W.2d 255, 261 (1969).
See State v. Coubal, 248 Wis. 247, 21 N.W.2d 381 (1946).
State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 68, 315 N.W.2d 703, 721 (1982).
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power . 2 Since section 8 of article VII of the Wisconsin Constitution expressly empowered the judiciary to initiate criminal prosecutions by complaint and granted the legislature the authority to alter this power, and
section 4(1) of article VI of the Wisconsin Constitution did not confer this
power on the district attorney, section 968.02(3) cannot constitute a violation of the doctrine of the separation of powers.
Moreover, the challenged provision does not substantially impair, unreasonably burden or frustrate the prosecutorial function whatever its
source. It does not diminish the prosecutorial function at all. The provision actually grants the district attorney greater freedom in performing that
function than he or she had before its enactment. Considered in connection
with the simultaneous repeal of section 955.17, it contradicts the assertion
of the Connors majority that section 968.02(3) enables the judge to "override and set at naught the district attorney's discretionary declination to
83
prosecute.
In Wisconsin law, the filing of an information is the operative act in the
process of prosecuting a felony.8 4 It represents the decision to prosecute
whereas the refusal to file represents the decision not to prosecute. With
the repeal of Wisconsin Statute section 955.17, the decision of the district
attorney to decline to file an information is conclusive.
As regards misdemeanors, in which the complaint serves both to accuse
and to charge, even if the court files the complaint when the district attorney declines to do so, the district attorney may still decline to prosecute and
cannot be compelled to do so. 85 In fact, the enactment of the challenged
provision did not change the practice as it existed prior to its enactment, for
during the period from 1945 to 1969, the complainant had the option of
applying either to the magistrate or to the district attorney to issue a complaint. If rejected by one, application could be made to the other.
If the magistrate found probable cause, either when the complaint was
made to him in the first instance or after the district attorney's refusal to
issue, it was the magistrate's obligation to issue the complaint and proceed
against the accused. If the complaint was made to the district attorney,
either in the first instance or after a refusal by the magistrate, the district

82. See, e.g., Scarpaci v. Milwaukee County, 96 Wis. 2d 663, 676 n.9, 292 N.W.2d 816, 822
n.9 (1982).
83. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d at 139, 401 N.W.2d at 791.
84. See generally State v. Copening, 103 Wis. 2d 564, 309 N.W.2d 850 (1981); State v.
Woehrer, 83 Wis. 2d 696, 266 N.W.2d 366 (1978); Pillsbury v. State, 31 Wis. 2d 87, 93, 142
N.W.2d 187, 190 (1966); Wis. STAT. §§ 971.01 - 971.03 (1985-86).
85. 63 AM. JUR. 2D ProsecutingAttorneys § 24, at 312 (1984).
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attorney had the discretion to decline to issue the complaint, even if he
found probable cause.
Section 968.02(3) simply strengthened the authority of the district attorney by providing that complaints could be issued only by the district attorney except where he refused or was unavailable to issue, in which case the
court was empowered to do so. This procedure is constitutional because the
constitution has preserved the original jurisdiction of the court to initiate a
criminal proceeding unless the legislature provides otherwise. In short, the
challenged provision does not alter the power to prosecute. It deals only
with the authority to accuse which is a traditional judicial function.
Similar considerations make inappropriate a comparison of the
prosecutorial functions of the district attorney with those of the United
States Attorney. None of the federal cases cited by the Connors majority
deal with the, question of whether a United States Magistrate may issue a
criminal complaint without the approval of the United States Attorney.
Only United States v. Cox86 contains the language that, as an incident of the
constitutional separation of powers, the courts ought not interfere with the
discretionary power of the United States Attorney to control prosecution.
But even though Cox is frequently cited for that language the verbiage is
irrelevant.
Cox involved a contempt order against a United States Attorney who
refused to prepare and sign an indictment as issued by a grand jury and
ordered by the district judge. The applicable federal statute requires that a
valid indictment be signed by the United States Attorney." The decision
was rendered by an en banc court, three of whom decided that the United
States Attorney had the discretion to refuse to prepare and sign the indictment, and three of whom decided to the contrary. The swing vote decided
that the district attorney must prepare but need not sign the indictment
because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7 gave the district attorney
discretion to refuse to sign.8 8 The quotation cited by the Connors majority
was taken from the opinion of the judges in the first group.
In fact, however, it is statutory regulation8 9 and the administrative direction from the Judicial Conference of the United States, not the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, which place control over the
issuance of criminal complaints with the United States Attorney rather

86. 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965).
87. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
88. Id.
89. Id.
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than the United States Magistrate.9" Sound principles of administration,
not constitutional limitations, justify conceding authority to initiate a criminal proceeding in the federal courts to the United States Attorney, rather
than to the United States Magistrate. 91
VI.

SUMMARY

The initiation of criminal proceedings has always been treated as a judicial function in Wisconsin. The prosecutorial function of the district attorney never included the authority to initiate a criminal proceeding until the
legislature created it in 1945. The supreme court twice rejected attacks on
the constitutional power of the legislature to authorize the court to exercise
this function.
For more than 100 years, this power was recognized and accepted by
the bench, bar and public officials. For almost 100 years with similar recognition, the court was empowered to reject the district attorney's refusal to
file an information and the district attorney was then under a statutory obligation to file one.
Having been empowered by the constitution to confer the exclusive authority on the circuit court to initiate criminal proceedings, the legislature
could retain it for the court, deny it or limit it, as it did in the challenged
provision. It transferred this exclusive power to the district attorney in the
same statute in which it reserved the power for the court when the district
attorney declined to exercise it and in which it repealed the authority of the
court to reject the district attorney's refusal to file an information.
One must therefore dispute the assertion of the Connors majority that
"[w]e write upon a clean slate." 9 The author of the decision, Chief Justice
Heffernan, was a member of the unanimous court in State ex rel. Pflanz v.
County Court of Dane County93 which recognized the authority of the magistrate to file a criminal complaint until 1949. Chief Justice Heffernan also
wrote the opinion in State ex rel. Perry v. Wolke, 94 which quoted with ap90. Legal Manual for U.S. Magistrates ch. 5 (1979) (citing U.S. Judicial Conference Report
of 1971)); See Manual for U.S. Commissioners 5 (1948); see also United States ex rel. Savage v.
Arnold, 403 F. Supp. 172, 174 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (citing 8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 305, at
3-7 (lst ed. 1965)); Annotation, Power of Private Citizens to Institute CriminalProceedings Without Authorization or Approval by ProsecutingAttorney, 66 A.L.R. 3D 734 n.7 (1975).
91. Annotation, Necessity and Sufficiency of Government Attorney's Signature on Indictment
or Information (Rule 7(c) of Federal Rules of CriminalProcedure), 5 A.L.R. FED. 922, 931-33
(1970).
92. State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 136, 401 N.W.2d 782, 788
(1987).
93. 36 Wis. 2d 550, 153 N.W.2d 559 (1967).
94. 71 Wis. 2d 100, 237 N.W.2d 678 (1976).
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proval the language of the court in Faustv. State,95 sustaining the constitutionality of the procedure first prescribed by sections 1 and 2 of the Act for
the Arrest and Examination of Offenders of 1839.96 He also wrote the opinion in State ex rel. Kurkierewicz v. Cannon9 7 which cited section 955.17
with approval.
By limiting attention entirely to the role of the district attorney in prosecution, ignoring his historic absence from the accusatory process and disregarding the role of the legislature and the courts in the initiation of criminal
proceedings, the Connors decision presents a distorted view of the effect of
the challenged provision.
Section 968.02(3) does not unduly burden or substantially interfere with
the prosecuting function, whether its source be legislative or constitutional.
It does not affect that function at all. The district attorney is still empowered to decline to file an information or in the alternative to proceed with
the prosecution. The charging function of the district attorney is
unimpaired.
The only function that is affected is the accusatory function of filing a
complaint which is legislative in origin. Since this role was conferred by the
legislature it may constitutionally be limited as provided in section
968.02(3).
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article is not intended to suggest that sound public policy should
not recognize the wisdom of entrusting the initiation of criminal proceedings to the prosecutor. Rather its purpose is to show that it is not unconstitutional to subject the prosecutor's decision not to commence such
proceedings to the judicial scrutiny contemplated.by section 968.02(3).
The courts of some jurisdictions deferring to federal doctrine have based
their objections to the validity of the grant of authority to the courts to
review such exercise of prosecutorial discretion on the ground that such
authority violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 98 However, their
constitutional provisions, constitutional histories and subsequent pertinent

95. 45 Wis. 273 (1878).
96. An Act to Providefor the Arrest and Examinationof Offenders, Commitment for Trial and
Taking Bail, 1839 STAT. OF TERRITORY OF Wis. 369, § 102; see supra note 21.
97. 42 Wis. 2d 368, 166 N.W.2d 255 (1969).
98. See Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1546-47; Note, supranote 2, at 489 n.6; see also People v.
Municipal Court Ventura County, 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645 (Ct. App. 1972);
Annotation, supra note 90, at 732.
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decisions differ from ours in Wisconsin.9 9 As one critic suggests, there is a
substantial difference between restricting judicial review to the limited circumstances set forth in Section 968.02(3) and providing for it in all cases."
Besides, those decisions rest primarily on grounds of public policy rather
than constitutional limitations.
Under all circumstances, State ex reL UnnamedPetitionersv. Connors °1
should be overruled at the first opportunity and the statute should be
amended to permit appellate review of a judge's refusal to allow the issuance of a complaint as recommended by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals in
Gavcus v. Maroney.102 If section 968.02(3) is deemed impractical or ineffective, it should be repealed.

99. See State v. Beno, 116 Wis. 2d 122, 135, 341 N.W.2d 668, 674 (1984). Our supreme court
has admonished us to be guided by our own practices and traditions, not by that of others. Id.
100. See Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1546.
101. 136 Wis. 2d 118, 401 N.W.2d 782 (1987).
102. 127 Wis. 2d 69, 71, 377 N.W.2d 200, 201 (Ct. App. 1985).

